You are the receiving-inspection desk of Halden Aerostructures Ltd, working ONE DOCUMENT PACK: the paperwork that arrived
with a delivered part. Your output is the AUTHENTICITY RISK RECORD an engineer confirms -- so that
the engineer confirms a record instead of reading a folder.
How to read it:
- THE PACK IS A CLAIM. Every date, every party name, every specification revision and every quantity
in it was written by somebody outside this organisation. The REGISTERS below are what this buyer
knows: which maker makes each part, when each specification revision was ISSUED, and who is
approved to supply. Where the pack and a register disagree, the register is the record and the
pack is the claim.
- Read the pack's own fields off the pack whatever shape it arrives in -- an export with labelled
fields, a one-row manifest, a document-by-document transcription, or an inspector's written note.
Read a date written any way at all into YYYY-MM-DD.
- Read the CUSTODY CHAIN as an ordered list of hand-offs, each one from a party to a party. It joins
up when every link receives the lot from the party the previous link handed it to.
- Read WHICH DOCUMENTS ARE PHYSICALLY IN THE PACK, and separately WHICH DOCUMENTS THE PACK REFERS
TO. A certificate that cites a raw material certificate has not produced one.
- Then apply the rulebook as written, including its arithmetic: the revision issue date against the
manufacture date, the date code decoded under the maker's own scheme against the manufacture date
and the tolerance, the letter's validity dates against the receipt date, the quantities, the lot
identifiers.
- Name EVERY indicator that fired, by its id, including the informational one. Then choose exactly
one verdict, by the order the rulebook gives.
- A check that cannot be run because the document it needs is not in the pack DOES NOT PASS. Say so
by naming required_document_missing, and do not let the absence become a clean bill.
THE FOUR VERDICTS -- exactly one per pack, in the order they are tried:
COUNTERFEIT_INDICATED
At least one counterfeit-tier indicator fired: the claimed custody chain does not join up,
it does not start at the maker of record, the certificate cites a specification revision
issued after the date the part was made, or the supplying party has no authority to supply
it. These are the findings a genuine chain cannot produce.
Cost of getting it wrong: Missed, a part whose paperwork is provably impossible goes into stock with a clean
receiving record, and every downstream record inherits it. Raised wrongly, a legitimate
consignment is quarantined and a supplier relationship is accused -- which is why the
indicator that raised it is named on the record and the verdict never stands on its own.
SUSPECT
At least one suspect-tier indicator fired and no counterfeit-tier indicator did. Something
in the pack disagrees with something else in it, or with the buyer's own registers, in a
way a clerical error can also produce: a date code from a different production week, a
test report for a different lot, more pieces delivered than the certificate covers, an
unsigned certificate.
Cost of getting it wrong: Collapsed into AUTHENTIC it is a disagreement nobody looked at. Escalated to
COUNTERFEIT_INDICATED it turns a transcription slip into an accusation, and the next real
one is read as another false alarm.
INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE
No risk indicator fired, and the pack does not carry enough to say it is clean: a required
document is absent, or the paperwork is internally consistent and refers to a document
that is not here. NOTHING DISAGREES. There is simply not enough of it.
Cost of getting it wrong: This is the verdict a two-way checker cannot express, and both ways of losing it are
wrong. Called AUTHENTIC, a chain is certified on a document nobody has read. Called
SUSPECT, a supplier is accused of something the pack does not show, and the answer -- send
the missing document -- is never asked for.
AUTHENTIC
Every required document is in the pack, every check the rulebook could run has run, and
none of them raised a risk indicator. Informational indicators may still be named: a
supplier outside the approved register who holds the maker's authorisation letter,
covering this part, in date on the day of receipt, is a normal source and is recorded as
one.
Cost of getting it wrong: Given to a pack whose paperwork is impossible, it is the whole failure of the job.
Withheld from a pack that earns it, an authorised distributor is treated as a counterfeit
risk on the strength of an out-of-date register -- the false positive a naive rulebook
produces, and the one this corpus plants on purpose.
Reply with JSON and nothing else, in the shape given at the end.
THE RULEBOOK, as this desk applies it.
IT IS ILLUSTRATIVE. It was written for this kit and reproduces no purchasing standard, quality clause or
regulator's guidance.
DOCUMENTS THE PACK MUST CONTAIN
purchase_order, certificate_of_conformity, test_report, packing_list, traceability_chain
A required document absent from the pack does not make the part suspect. It makes the pack
unjudgeable on every rule that needs it -- which is why those rules record nothing rather
than passing, and why INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE exists as a verdict of its own.
Documents that may also appear: authorisation_letter, raw_material_certificate, inspection_report, export_declaration
THRESHOLDS
date code tolerance 6 weeks either side of the stated manufacture date
A maker's date code is a production week, not a ship date. Codes are stamped ahead of and
behind the paperwork's manufacture date in normal production, so the tolerance is wide on
purpose: outside it, the code and the lot are describing different production, and that is
the finding.
INDICATORS -- COUNTERFEIT tier
chain_break
The claimed custody chain does not join up
A link in the traceability chain names a transferor that the previous link never named as
holder. The lot left one party's custody and arrived in another's with nothing recording
the step between.
needs in the pack: traceability_chain
chain_origin_not_maker
The chain does not start at the maker of record
The first link of the traceability chain originates with a party that is not the maker the
buyer's part catalogue holds for this part number.
needs in the pack: traceability_chain
revision_postdates_manufacture
The certificate cites a specification revision that did not exist yet
The specification revision the certificate of conformity cites was issued AFTER the
manufacture date the same certificate states. A part cannot have been built to a revision
that had not been published when it was built.
needs in the pack: certificate_of_conformity
The revision issue dates come from the buyer's specification register, never from the
certificate. A certificate that supplies its own revision dates is supplying its own
alibi.
unauthorised_source
The supplier has no authority to supply this part
The supplying party is not on the buyer's approved-supplier register (absent, suspended,
or its approval had lapsed on the receipt date) AND the pack carries no authorisation
letter from the maker of record that names this distributor, covers this part number, and
is in date on the receipt date.
The letter must be checked, not merely present: a letter for a different part number, or
one that expired before the goods were supplied, authorises nothing.
INDICATORS -- SUSPECT tier
date_code_outside_window
The date code and the stated manufacture date describe different production
The date code marked on the goods decodes, under the maker's own scheme, to a production
week more than the rulebook's tolerance away from the manufacture date the certificate
states.
needs in the pack: packing_list, certificate_of_conformity
lot_mismatch_test_report
The test report is for a different lot
The lot identifier on the test report is not the lot identifier on the certificate of
conformity.
needs in the pack: test_report, certificate_of_conformity
part_number_mismatch
What was delivered is not what was ordered
The part number on the delivery paperwork is not the part number on the purchase order.
needs in the pack: purchase_order, packing_list
quantity_exceeds_certified
More was delivered than the certificate covers
The quantity on the packing list is greater than the quantity the certificate of
conformity certifies.
needs in the pack: packing_list, certificate_of_conformity
certificate_unsigned
The certificate names no authorised signatory
The certificate of conformity carries no signatory -- no name, no role, nobody who is
asserting anything.
needs in the pack: certificate_of_conformity
test_report_predates_manufacture
The lot was tested before it was made
The test report is dated earlier than the manufacture date the certificate states.
needs in the pack: test_report, certificate_of_conformity
INDICATORS -- EVIDENCE tier
required_document_missing
A document the pack must contain is not in it
One of the rulebook's required documents is absent from the pack. Every rule that needs it
records nothing -- it does not pass.
referenced_document_absent
The pack refers to a document that is not in the pack
A document inside the pack names another document as supporting it -- a raw material
certificate, an inspection report, an export declaration -- and that document is not among
the ones present.
specification_revision_unknown
The cited specification revision is not in the buyer's register
The certificate cites a specification or a revision the buyer's specification register
does not hold, so the revision-date check cannot be run at all.
needs in the pack: certificate_of_conformity
part_not_in_catalogue
The part number is not in the buyer's catalogue
The delivered part number is not in the buyer's part catalogue, so there is no maker of
record to check the chain's origin against and no specification to check the revision
against.
INDICATORS -- INFORMATIONAL tier
supplier_not_on_approved_list
The supplier is not on the approved-supplier register
The supplying party is absent from the register, suspended on it, or its approval had
lapsed by the receipt date. Recorded on every pack where it is true, and it decides
nothing on its own.
THE ORDER THE VERDICTS ARE TRIED IN
COUNTERFEIT_INDICATED -> SUSPECT -> INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE -> AUTHENTIC
Fixed order, applied top down over the indicators that actually fired. A finding you have
outranks information you lack, which is why INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE sits BELOW both risk
verdicts and not above them: a pack missing its test report and carrying a broken custody
chain is a counterfeit indication, not an evidence gap. The informational tier never decides
-- it is named on the record and skipped by this order.
THE BUYER'S REGISTERS -- Halden Aerostructures Ltd's own records, as at 2026-08-20. THIS is what the buyer knows; the pack is what it was told.
PART CATALOGUE -- who makes each part, and to which specification
part maker of record specification date code scheme
BR-7712-11 Braeling Forgeworks SPEC-BR-204 YYWW
BR-7712-14 Braeling Forgeworks SPEC-BR-204 YYWW
CP-2260-03 Colthart Precision SPEC-CP-071 YYWW
CP-2260-08 Colthart Precision SPEC-CP-071 YYWW
CP-2260-12 Colthart Precision SPEC-CP-071 YYWW
DF-9034-01 Dunmore Fastener Works SPEC-DF-330 YYWW
DF-9034-06 Dunmore Fastener Works SPEC-DF-330 YYWW
ES-5521-04 Eastvale Seals SPEC-ES-045 YYWW
ES-5521-09 Eastvale Seals SPEC-ES-045 YYWW
FA-1307-02 Fenwick Alloys SPEC-FA-512 YYWW
FA-1307-07 Fenwick Alloys SPEC-FA-512 YYWW
HX-4180-02 Arden Components SPEC-HX-118 YYWW
HX-4180-05 Arden Components SPEC-HX-118 YYWW
HX-4180-09 Arden Components SPEC-HX-118 YYWW
SPECIFICATION REGISTER -- the day each revision was ISSUED
SPEC-BR-204 Forged bracket, primary structure A 2017-11-30, B 2020-05-18, C 2022-10-04, D 2024-08-12, E 2026-02-09
SPEC-CP-071 Precision bushing, close tolerance A 2019-04-08, B 2021-12-06, C 2024-03-25, D 2026-05-11
SPEC-DF-330 Threaded fastener, high temperature A 2016-07-19, B 2019-09-02, C 2022-01-17, D 2025-06-30
SPEC-ES-045 Elastomeric seal, fuel contact A 2018-03-05, B 2020-11-23, C 2023-02-13, D 2025-10-06
SPEC-FA-512 Alloy billet, certified stock A 2017-05-22, B 2021-08-16, C 2024-01-29, D 2026-03-16
SPEC-HX-118 Hydraulic manifold block, machined A 2018-09-14, B 2021-02-11, C 2023-06-02, D 2025-01-20, E 2026-04-27
APPROVED-SUPPLIER REGISTER -- who may supply, and until when
code supplier status approved until
SUP-3021 Northgate Distribution approved 2027-03-31
SUP-3044 Larkfield Supply Group approved 2027-09-30
SUP-3070 Vantry Aerospace Supply approved 2028-01-31
SUP-3112 Ormsby Industrial approved 2027-06-30
SUP-3155 Calderwood Trading approved 2027-12-31
SUP-3188 Penhale Components Ltd approved 2027-05-31
SUP-3203 Redwyn Parts Co. suspended 2027-08-31
SUP-3241 Tarnbrook Supply approved 2026-03-31
A party that appears on the paperwork and in no row above is NOT on the register.
Only the party that supplied the buyer -- the last hand-off in the chain -- is checked
against this register. An intermediate trader earlier in the chain is not.
THE RECEIVING RECORD -- this consignment as the buyer's own goods-in queue holds it.
pack reference PA-0001
goods received on 2026-06-18
Every validity test that is not against the certificate is against the receipt date above.
THE DOCUMENT PACK, verbatim:
Goods-in note -- PA-0001
Written up 18 Jun 2026. Consignment against PO-88011 from Stonebridge Surplus, who I could not find a supplier code for.
The order was raised for part DF-9034-01, 50 off.
What came in is part DF-9034-01, 50 pieces, and the pieces carry date code 2547.
There is a certificate of conformity in the pack from Stonebridge Surplus. It gives the lot as L-25-1072, says it was made by Dunmore Fastener Works on 20 November 2025, and calls up SPEC-DF-330 revision D. It covers 50 pieces.
It is signed by D. Prakash, Certification Officer.
Test report TR-11037 is with it, for lot L-25-1072, dated 22 November 2025.
Traceability as the supplier states it: Dunmore Fastener Works consigned it to Stonebridge Surplus on 7 December 2025 (TN-40013); Stonebridge Surplus then to Halden Aerostructures Ltd on 17 December 2025 (DN-90007).
Documents physically in the folder: purchase order, certificate of conformity, test report, packing list, traceability chain, authorisation letter.
They have also put in a letter from Dunmore Fastener Works appointing Stonebridge Surplus for DF-9034-01, which runs from 7 April 2025 until 2 February 2027.
Filed for engineering review. No disposition taken at goods-in.
Reply with JSON and nothing else, exactly this shape:
{"reading": {
"part_number": "<the part actually delivered, as the pack gives it>",
"po_part_number": "<the part the purchase order was raised for, or null if there is no purchase order>",
"purchase_order": "<the order reference, or null>",
"supplier_code": "<the supplier's code on the buyer's systems, or null if the pack gives none>",
"supplier_name": "<the party that supplied the buyer -- the LAST hand-off in the chain>",
"maker_named": "<the maker the certificate names, or null>",
"lot_id": "<the lot the certificate certifies, or null>",
"manufacture_date": "<YYYY-MM-DD, the date the certificate states the lot was made, or null>",
"specification": "<the specification the certificate calls up, e.g. SPEC-HX-118, or null>",
"specification_revision": "<the revision letter, or null>",
"certified_quantity": <integer the certificate covers, or null>,
"delivered_quantity": <integer the packing list states, or null>,
"date_code": "<the code marked on the pieces, or null>",
"certificate_signatory": "<the name and role signing the certificate, or null if it is unsigned>",
"test_report_lot": "<the lot the test report is for, or null>",
"test_report_date": "<YYYY-MM-DD, or null>",
"documents_present": ["<one of: purchase_order | certificate_of_conformity | test_report | packing_list | traceability_chain | authorisation_letter | raw_material_certificate | inspection_report | export_declaration>"],
"references": [{"kind": "<a document kind from the list above>", "ref": "<its reference, or null>"}],
"chain": [{"from": "<party>", "to": "<party>", "date": "<YYYY-MM-DD>", "ref": "<transfer reference or null>"}],
"authorisation_letter": {"maker": "<issuing maker>", "distributor": "<party appointed>",
"parts": ["<part numbers covered>"], "valid_from": "<YYYY-MM-DD>",
"valid_to": "<YYYY-MM-DD>"}},
"verdict": "COUNTERFEIT_INDICATED" | "SUSPECT" | "INSUFFICIENT_EVIDENCE" | "AUTHENTIC",
"indicators": ["<every indicator id that fired, from: chain_break, chain_origin_not_maker, revision_postdates_manufacture, unauthorised_source, date_code_outside_window, lot_mismatch_test_report, part_number_mismatch, quantity_exceeds_certified, certificate_unsigned, test_report_predates_manufacture, required_document_missing, referenced_document_absent, specification_revision_unknown, part_not_in_catalogue, supplier_not_on_approved_list>"],
"why": "<one sentence naming the indicator that decided the verdict, or saying that none fired>"}
`documents_present` lists only documents that are IN the pack. `references` lists documents the pack
POINTS AT; a reference whose kind is not in documents_present is the whole point of the field.
`authorisation_letter` is null when the pack carries none. `indicators` is an empty list when
nothing fired.