Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
Every provider file has to be read for any sanction, however mildly worded, and its license and verification dates checked against the start date. This app reads each file, fills in ten details and flags the ones the committee must review.
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
For the credentialing teamCross-domain · Healthcare
Why it matters
Today's manual process, and the same job with the app
A credentialing team at a health plan or medical group, preparing provider files for the credentialing committee.
✕Today's manual process
1Read every file to pull out the name, NPI, license and verification details.
2Check each date manually against the file's effective date: is the license expired, is the check stale?
3Judge the finding and decide whether a mildly worded reprimand still counts as an adverse action.
4One miss lets an adverse action reach the committee unnoticed.
Every file read and checked manually
✓With the app
1Each file is read, and ten details are filled in, each pointing to the section it came from.
2The dates are checked against the effective date, and an expired license or stale check is flagged.
3Any adverse action is flagged, however mildly worded, with the reason shown.
4The committee still decides. The app flags and explains; it never approves a provider.
Flagged files arrive with the reason
See it work
One real case, read by the app, step by step
Jordan K. Haddad's file shows a public reprimand, followed by “license otherwise active and in good standing.”
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee reviewReference appBuilt to be shaped to your process
5
1The provider's file name, NPI and license number read out, each tied to its section.
2The dates license expiry and the latest check, both measured against the effective date.
3The finding a public reprimand, though the same line says “good standing”.
4What does not clear it “good standing” does not cancel the reprimand: adverse action found, yes.
5Sent to committee flagged for review, with the reason. The committee still decides.
For engineers
How it is built, and how we measured it
All fourteen steps of the build are written up, from the business case to running it in your own environment.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
A small, forkable project that does one job end to end. Run once for real, and every figure on these pages captured from that run.
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
The business caseThe problem this solves
Credentialing a provider file means reading the PSV finding to judge whether it describes any adverse action, however mildly worded, and checking the license and PSV check dates against the file's own effective date, before the file goes to a credentialing committee. Someone manually reading each credentialing file's PSV finding to judge whether it describes any adverse action, however mildly worded, and checking the license and PSV dates against the file's own effective date before the file goes to a credentialing committee.
Audience
Credentialing specialists and committee coordinators at a health plan or medical group who reconcile provider files before a credentialing or recredentialing decision, and the people who build tooling for them. Every number on these pages came from one real run of this code, not from a vendor page.
The inputThe actual files
The corpus is 55 files, 0.03 MB (txt 55). Plain text, one format, invented rather than fetched — a real credentialing file cannot be published either (see SOURCES.md). Ten fields are chosen because the same ones matter to a credentialing review: who, license status, PSV source and date, and — the field this kit exists to test — whether the PSV finding describes any adverse action, however mildly worded.
The corpus
The 55 filesgenerated from a fixed seed, so no real record, person or institution appears in it.
Where each came fromwritten for this kit rather than collected — the corpus is generated in the kit's own repository, so there is no third-party data in it.
Swap this folder for your own material and the kit is pointed at your files. That is the whole change — there is no database to migrate.
One file, as the model receives itCR-0001.txt · 1 of 55
Provider
--------
Casey D. Rossi
NPI
---
1985767922
Provider Type
-------------
nurse_practitioner
License Number
--------------
NP-083692
License Expiration Date
-----------------------
2027-06-15
Credentialing Effective Date
----------------------------
2026-08-06
PSV Check Date
--------------
2026-06-21
PSV Source
----------
OIG-LEIE exclusion database
PSV Finding
-----------
No adverse action found. License current and unrestricted.
The outcomeWhat a good result looks like
A ten-field extracted record per file, plus one pure-code computed flag folding three checks together — an expired license, a stale PSV check, or any adverse action found — informational only, never a credentialing or network-participation determination.
And when it cannot
This run found zero extraction or flag errors across 55 files on either tier — there is no observed failure to report from the run itself. What the run did not test: a PSV finding mixing a mild adverse action with unrelated reassuring language in a way this corpus did not plant, a name-variant mismatch between the file and the PSV source, or a second, corroborating PSV source — this kit reads one file at a time and never cross-references a second source. See Business.not_good_enough.
Where it fitsWhat did work
Every line below is a measured result from this kit's own runs, with the figure that supports it. The headline above is not softened by any of them.
Screening a stack of credentialing files for which ones need a credentialing committee to review an adverse action, an expired license, or a stale PSV check before the file is approved — either tier — they tie at 1.00 recall and precision measured here 100% review-flag recall on both tiers, against the free severe-keyword floor's 65.71% recall (12 missed review flags, all mild-worded adverse actions).
Deciding the two tiers on cost or speed when accuracy is identical — the fast tier Lower p50 latency (2,500 ms vs 4,268 ms) and fewer output tokens per call (300 vs 315 avg) for identical extraction and flag scores — the smallest tier gap measured across this four-kit series so far.
At a glanceHow the whole thing runs
100%extraction accuracy
2,500 msp50, end to end
$1.29per 1,000 files · Google Gemini 3 Flash
Run once, for real, on 2026-08-21. Every figure on these pages was captured from that run — nothing is written from intent.
14 steps, grouped by the question that sends you to them rather than by build order. Each tile carries the one figure that step is about, and opens the page behind it.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review14 steps · 4 questions · run once, for real · 2026-08-21
Every tile is a linkall 14 steps · no step without a page
Should you use this?What you bring, where it stops, and when not to use it
Before you commit an afternoon to this, these are the answers that decide it. Each one is rendered from the record it lives in — and links the page that holds it in full.
What do I have to bring?
Replace data/corpus/*.txt, write data/fields.json, and supply a gold record per file. Corpus lens →
When is this the wrong choice?
Avoid: The severe-keyword floor for the adverse-action judgment specifically — its fixed word list is exactly what the planted ambiguity is built to defeat. That is the case against the best-fitting scenario (“Screening a stack of credentialing files for which ones need a credentialing committee to review an adverse action, an expired license, or a stale PSV check before the file is approved”). 2 scenarios scored in all, each with its own.Eval lens →
Where does it stop working?
Scanned or image-only files — there is no OCR step. 3 recorded failure modes, each from a run rather than a guess.Corpus lens →
What was never verified?
Whether the model would still hit 100% recall on a larger, adversarially-constructed set of mild adverse-action phrasings — this run's 17 mild cases all resolved correctly on both tiers, but 17 cases is not enough to rule out a harder wording this corpus did not think to plant. 3 items this kit says it could not check.Eval lens →
Can I run this on a model I control?
Yes — any OpenAI-compatible endpoint, including one on your own hardware. The shipped adapter takes its host from BASE_URL and its model from MODEL, so nothing in src/ changes. The published figures come from 2 models on the fast tier and the deliberating tier, one provider, one key. Prompt lens →
And if it fits — what do I stand up?
4 artifacts with a stated home and a stated egress, and 3 decisions each with what you provision past its ceiling — plus what was not measured. That is the next page, not this one.step 14 — Run it in your environment →
Not asked of this kit — 2 questions: clone (a fresh clone of this kit runs with nothing fetched); judge (nothing here is graded by a model).
Last verified 2026-08-21 — r001-credential-verify. Every figure on these pages was captured from that run.
Run itHow this reaches your data
Every result on this page was produced by pure code over checked-in files, with no API key — which is why you can read the numbers before anyone spends anything.
Run this on your own data
The pipeline, its eval harness and the runs behind every numberdeployed inside your environment, on your own model endpoints, against your own documents.
The corpus above is the shape, not the limitit is a folder swap, and there is no database to migrate.
Checked before this shipped — Verified from a cold clone with no key configured: 55 files segment into 495 sections in 0.009 seconds, and the assembled prompt for CR-0007 replays byte for byte — its three part sizes match what run r001 recorded.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 01 of 14Business case
Written for: product manager · Measured during the eval run. Never estimated, never quoted from a vendor page.
In brief
100.0%rows answered
2,500 msp50, end to end
3,422 msp95
2 minclone to first result
What the clock covers. model call only, one per file
Current processWhat it replaces
Someone manually reading each credentialing file's PSV finding to judge whether it describes any adverse action, however mildly worded, and checking the license and PSV dates against the file's own effective date before the file goes to a credentialing committee.
Where it is not good enough
This run found zero extraction errors across 55 files on either tier — every one of 550 cells hit, every span resolved, 1.00 recall and precision on the review flag on both tiers. That is a small sample for a rule this consequential, and a clean run says nothing about the harder cases this corpus does not test: a finding that mixes a mild adverse action with a genuinely unrelated positive note in the same sentence, a name-variant mismatch between the file and the PSV source, or a non-English file. It also reads one file at a time and never cross-references a second PSV source — see Data.breaks_on.
One question, end to end. Colour on the fan-in is the corpus format; a red hook marks every station with a recorded failure, and the words — every sub line, failure and report field — are in the ledger beneath. Every station is a link — click one to jump to its row, and each row links to the lens that explains it.
The free severe-keyword floor (evals/baseline.py, checks the PSV finding ONLY for four fixed severe words) scores 96.91 pct extraction accuracy but 65.71 pct flag recall — 12 missed review flags, every one a mild-worded adverse action (a reprimand, consent order or letter of concern) the floor's word list never matches — against 100 pct flag recall and precision on both tiers here, with zero errors of any kind. No red-team run exists for this kit — this footer names that absence rather than a resistance rate it does not have.
The swap seams
Seam
File
What changes
SECTION_HINTS
src/select.py
map fields to your own file's headings; unmatched falls back to the whole document
PROVIDERS
src/adapters/__init__.py
any OpenAI-compatible host, or Anthropic's Messages API
PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS
src/extract.py
this kit's own flat lookback window — replace with your actual accreditation standard's published requirement before trusting the computed flag for anything real
the field schema
data/fields.json
a different set of fields entirely, with its own types and allowed values
Components
Component
File
Role
segment
src/segment.py
cut the file into addressable sections, pure code
select
src/select.py
pick which sections carry each field, pure code
prompt
src/prompt.py
assemble one call for all ten fields
extract
src/extract.py
the AI layer, one provider one key — plus the pure-code computation downstream: three independent checks folded into one review flag
judge
evals/judge.py
score field accuracy and the flag's recall/precision separately, pure code
Where it breaks at scale
One call per file, no concurrency and nothing shared between calls: 55 files took a few minutes wall clock on the fast tier. A stack of thousands needs batching and a rate-limit strategy this kit does not have. It also never cross-references a second PSV source — a real credentialing file is often checked against more than one primary source this kit never reads.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 03 of 14App UI
Written for: anyone, in 5 seconds · Screenshots of the running app taken during the run.
SuccessesWhen it works
Before anything is asked of the model. Ten named fields with their own types and allowed values, plus a second panel for the computed flag and its reasons.successOpen full size →CR-0007, extracted live. A PSV finding reading "Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing" correctly reads sanction_or_adverse_action_found: yes despite the reassuring second half of the sentence, and the computed panel routes it: "YES — route to credentialing committee," reason adverse_action.successOpen full size →
LimitsWhen it does not
A report showing only wins is an advert. This one is required, and the validator now refuses a kit that omits it.
The same button with no API_KEY configured. A calm 200 and a plain sentence, not a stack trace: nothing was called, nothing was spent, and the field table stays browsable.failureOpen full size →
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 04 of 14Corpus
Written for: "can I point this at mine?" · Measured off the corpus the run actually used.
In brief
55files
0.03 MiBtxt 55
495sections · p50 46 chars
$0.00setup · 0.009s
How it is cutWhat one section is
cut on underlined section headings; a file with none falls back to one whole-document segment so a span still resolves
SetupWhat the setup figure measured
There is no index. Preparation is segmentation only — 55 files cut into 495 sections by src/segment.py, pure code, no model and no key.
LicenceLicence
MIT — this repository's own licence. Every provider, NPI, license number and PSV finding is invented; a real credentialing file cannot be published either — sanction and malpractice history is sensitive personal data tied to a real professional identity.
Bring your ownBring your own files
Replace data/corpus/*.txt, write data/fields.json, and supply a gold record per file. SECTION_HINTS in src/select.py maps fields to headings and will need editing for a different file layout; when it does not match, selection falls back to the whole document — slower, more expensive, always correct.
What breaks it
Scanned or image-only files — there is no OCR step.
A file whose sections are not headed — segment() falls back to one whole-document segment, so a span names "document" and locates nothing finer.
A second, corroborating PSV source is never cross-referenced — this kit reads the one PSV finding stated on the file, whatever it does or does not say.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 05 of 14Prompt
Written for: engineer · Logged from the run, verbatim.
In brief
The assembled prompt in full, and its real decomposition. Every part below occurs in the prompt that was actually sent, and the token counts sum to the recorded input total — they were measured against the provider’s own counter, not apportioned by character share.
AssemblyHow the prompt is assembled
Part
Characters
Tokens
system
931
295
field schema
1,193
291
file sections
497
203
Total
789
This is the cost lesson as arithmetic: of the 789 tokens assembled, 295 are instructions — 37% of the prompt, the largest single part. A per-request bill follows whichever part is biggest, and on this kit that is the one named here.
Measured token-for-token via evals/prompt_tokens.py's nested-prefix subtraction against the provider's own tokenizer, not estimated from characters — see results/tokens-p001-credential-verify.json.
Full promptThe prompt in full
The verbatim prompt, as sent
the prompt, as sent
SYSTEM:
You extract structured fields from a provider credentialing file. You return JSON and nothing else.
RULES, in order of importance:
1. If the file does not state a field, return null for it. Do not infer it, do not compute it, and do not use what you know about the world.
2. `sanction_or_adverse_action_found` means the PSV finding describes ANY adverse action against the provider -- a reprimand, consent order, letter of concern, restriction, suspension, revocation or exclusion -- HOWEVER MILDLY IT IS WORDED. A finding that says the license is 'otherwise active' or imposes 'no practice restriction' is still 'yes' if any adverse action is named anywhere in it. Only answer 'no' when the finding describes no adverse action of any kind.
3. Copy values verbatim from the file wherever possible.
4. Use the exact allowed value for a field that lists them.
5. Return every field named in the schema, even when the answer is null.
USER:
Extract these fields:
- provider_name (string) -- the provider's name, verbatim
- npi (string) -- the provider's National Provider Identifier
- license_number (string) -- the provider's license number
- provider_type (enum) one of: physician, nurse_practitioner, physician_assistant -- the provider type stated on the file
- license_expiration_date (string) -- the license's expiration date, YYYY-MM-DD
- credentialing_effective_date (string) -- the date the credentialing file must be current as of, YYYY-MM-DD
- psv_check_date (string) -- the date the primary source verification check was actually performed, YYYY-MM-DD
- psv_source (string) -- the primary source the PSV check queried
- psv_raw_finding (string) -- the PSV finding, copied verbatim
- sanction_or_adverse_action_found (enum) one of: yes, no -- does the PSV finding describe ANY adverse action against the provider -- a reprimand, consent order, letter of concern, restriction, suspension, revocation or exclusion -- however mildly it is worded? A finding that says the license is 'otherwise active' or imposes no practice restriction is still 'yes' if any adverse action is named at all. Only a finding with NO adverse action of any kind is 'no'.
Return a JSON object with exactly these keys: provider_name, npi, license_number, provider_type, license_expiration_date, credentialing_effective_date, psv_check_date, psv_source, psv_raw_finding, sanction_or_adverse_action_found
Use null for any field the file does not state.
CREDENTIALING FILE
-------------------
Provider
--------
Jordan K. Haddad
NPI
---
1838505831
Provider Type
-------------
nurse_practitioner
License Number
--------------
PA-048188
License Expiration Date
-----------------------
2026-08-04
Credentialing Effective Date
----------------------------
2026-03-22
PSV Check Date
--------------
2026-03-19
PSV Source
----------
NPDB self-query report
PSV Finding
-----------
Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing.
Raw responseThe raw response
The raw response, before any parsing
the response, unparsed
{
"provider_name": "Jordan K. Haddad",
"npi": "1838505831",
"license_number": "PA-048188",
"provider_type": "nurse_practitioner",
"license_expiration_date": "2026-08-04",
"credentialing_effective_date": "2026-03-22",
"psv_check_date": "2026-03-19",
"psv_source": "NPDB self-query report",
"psv_raw_finding": "Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing.",
"sanction_or_adverse_action_found": "yes"
}
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 06 of 14Evals
Written for: the skeptic · The harness output, with as_of / model version / dataset version / verified_by.
In brief
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review — 55 files. Two tiers of one model family answered, and every answer was then graded Two different ways — because the grade is a measurement too, and most of what went wrong on this kit went wrong in the ruler rather than the model.
55files
55source documents
2model tiers
110graded answers
2grading methods
MeasurementsWhat was measured
COUNTED550 · 550 / 550extraction accuracy — cellsDecided by == against a fixed gold value. No model graded this and it reproduces to the digit — which makes it checkable, not necessarily right: it is only as good as the gold behind it.
COUNTED35 · 35 / 35review-flag recall — files that should have been flaggedDecided by == against a fixed gold value. No model graded this and it reproduces to the digit — which makes it checkable, not necessarily right: it is only as good as the gold behind it.
NOT YET KNOWN—A person confirmed the gold is rightThe grader is == and needs no confirming. The gold does: it is machine-derived from the registry's structured modules, and every rate on this page rests on that derivation being faithful to what the prose actually says. Nobody has read a document against its gold record by hand.
Two words carry this page: Counted is deterministic and nobody's opinion and Not yet known is printed blank rather than filled with something plausible. There is no Judged row here and that is the point: nothing on this page is a model's opinion about another model. The row most worth having is currently the empty one.
How the method was validated
The scorer (evals/judge.py) is pure code, exact match against a mechanically-derived gold — there is no judgement to validate, only comparison. What WAS validated: tools/build_corpus.py's gold is read back off the same generated dates and PSV finding the document states, never carried over from a separate target, and evals/check_labels.py asserts every field is populated on every row before any run is allowed to spend. The TRUE review flag is derived by running the same pure-code compute() over gold's own values, never a separately-typed truth.
300.05output tokens · the fast tier · 2,500 ms p50
314.58output tokens · the deliberating tier · 4,268 ms p50
Two tiers, one API key
Not two vendors and not a vendor comparison — which is the whole reason the two-model rule could be met without signing up to a second provider. Both tiers send the same retrieved context; the slower one writes about twice as much back, waits 1.7× as long, and lands one row apart on 55. This set does not separate them on quality and no ranking should be read from it — which is not an opinion about the models but something the second run below demonstrated.
Grading costWhat it costs
Every dollar on these pages is a MEASURED token count multiplied by a named vendor's PUBLISHED rate — a projection onto a rate card, not a bill anyone paid.
Priced at
Per 1M in / out
One file
1,000 files
Share that is the prompt
Google Gemini 3 Flash the cheapest model Google publishes a rate for, and the card every kit in this series projects onto so the rows compare across use cases
$0.50 / $3.00
$0.001291
$1.29
30%
Same work, 1× the bill
The same files, the same tokens — only the rate card changed. And on that card about 30% of what you pay is the prompt this pipeline sends, not the answer it writes.
which tier is called — the two tiers tie on every accuracy and recall figure measured here, so the lever buys accuracy nothing; the fast tier is both cheaper and faster with no measured tradeoff.
Rates checked 2026-08-18. The provider that actually ran r001 and r002 publishes no rate card this repo commits, so nothing here is what was actually paid — the real spend for this kit's build is recorded in the commit history and the shared call ledger, not on this page.
the fast tier 100.0% · the deliberating tier 100.0%
Review-flag confusion matrix Does the run's own pure-code needs_review (folding together the expired-license, stale-PSV and adverse-action checks) match the same computation run over gold's own true values?
$0.00
no
yes
the fast tier 100.0% · the deliberating tier 100.0%
Every row opens its own page: how the test was run, the input on one real row, the prompt or formula with every iteration of it, and the analysis.
Why this set cannot separate them
Yes, between the models and the severe-keyword floor, not between the two model tiers. Both tiers hit 550/550 cells and 35/35 review flags identically — a perfect tie on every figure this run measured. The floor is what separates cleanly: 65.71% recall against 100%, on exactly the mild-worded adverse actions this corpus was built to plant.
Choosing oneWhich one to use
The comparison is only useful if it ends in a choice. The answer is conditional — and it is not the grader with the best agreement score.
If your situation is
Use
Because
And avoid
Screening a stack of credentialing files for which ones need a credentialing committee to review an adverse action, an expired license, or a stale PSV check before the file is approved
either tier — they tie at 1.00 recall and precision measured here
100% review-flag recall on both tiers, against the free severe-keyword floor's 65.71% recall (12 missed review flags, all mild-worded adverse actions).
the severe-keyword floor for the adverse-action judgment specifically — its fixed word list is exactly what the planted ambiguity is built to defeat.
Deciding the two tiers on cost or speed when accuracy is identical
the fast tier
Lower p50 latency (2,500 ms vs 4,268 ms) and fewer output tokens per call (300 vs 315 avg) for identical extraction and flag scores — the smallest tier gap measured across this four-kit series so far.
paying for the higher tier here — this run found nothing it bought.
This pipeline was also attacked, which is a different question from whether its answers are right: see Threat model for the injection experiment, its two gates and what it does not prove.
Failure causesHow it fails
Cause
What it means
Rows
A real example
mild-worded-adverse-action
Mild-worded adverse action, paired with reassuring language in the same sentence — the corpus's planted ambiguity, illustrated by the baseline (neither scored model tier fell into it on this run)
12
CR-0007: psv_raw_finding="Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing." Gold sanction_or_adverse_action_found=yes. The free severe-keyword floor (evals/baseline.py) matches none of its four…
What we could NOT verify
Whether the model would still hit 100% recall on a larger, adversarially-constructed set of mild adverse-action phrasings — this run's 17 mild cases all resolved correctly on both tiers, but 17 cases is not enough to rule out a harder wording this corpus did not think to plant.
Whether PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS=180 matches any real accreditation body's actual published lookback requirement — it does not, by design (see README); no real standard was consulted or reproduced.
How either tier performs on a real, messy credentialing file layout (a multi-page PDF packet, a payer-specific credentialing application form, a scanned PSV printout) — this corpus is plain text with a single, consistent underlined-heading layout by construction.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
Step 07 of 14Unit cost
Written for: whoever signs off on the bill · Measured over the eval run, per model. Never quoted from a vendor page.
In brief
Tier
Input tokens
Output tokens
p50 latency
Google Gemini 3 Flash
the fast tier
781.82
300.05
2,500 ms
$0.001291
the deliberating tier
781.82
314.58
4,268 ms
$0.001335
The token counts are measured on a real run and belong to this pipeline — which sections are selected, the field schema, the prompt — so they hold wherever you run it. The dollars are those counts multiplied by each vendor's published rate, checked 2026-08-18. Nobody paid these particular bills; they are what the same work would cost you on a card you can sign up to today.
Identical work in both rows — the same query, the same tokens. Only the price list changed. Which is why the token count is the measurement and the dollar is arithmetic you can redo on your own card.
Answering vs gradingAnswering and grading are two separate bills
The severe-keyword floor (evals/baseline.py) and the scorer (evals/judge.py) are both pure code and cost $0.00 to run against either result set. The figure above is both runs' own token counts (the fast-tier and deliberating-tier runs, 55 files each) priced at Google Gemini 3 Flash's published rate — the same basis cost_per_query_usd uses, not a second, larger spend.
Cost driversWhat actually moves the bill
The fixed system prompt and field schema (586 of 789 tokens on the example call, 74%) outweigh the file sections sent (203 tokens) on this example — the floor every call pays before a single PSV fact is read.
Output length: the model returns a full ten-key JSON record every call regardless of the file's own length.
Your volumeWhat it costs at your volume
Linear in files: each call is independent and self-contained, with no shared context or index to amortise. This run's 55 files cost about $0.071 projected onto Gemini 3 Flash's rate, so ten times the set is about $0.71 on the same rate and the same prompt — arithmetic on the measured per-call rate, not a second run.
Where pricing changes shape
Your return, with your numbers
Volume
What it replaces
Time saved per item
We publish the inputs, not a return: a return depends on your labour cost and your volume. The ROI dashboard takes it from here, and AI Costing explains the math.
Other modelsOn other models
This is arithmetic, not a run. No model below was executed against the labelled set, and no accuracy is claimed for any of them. What transfers is the input volume: retrieval is model-independent, so every model would receive the same passages.
43,000input tokens · this run
16,503output tokens
—not priced — no committed card for the provider that ran it
The exact work behind every number on these pages: 55 credentialing files extracted, each scored by pure code against a mechanically-derived gold set. This run (r001-credential-verify, the fast tier) answered all 55 of 55 files with no truncation -- the row this table prices, the same one Cost.cost_by_model[0] uses.
Model
Provider
One eval pass
This whole run
Per 1,000 queries
Rates as of
gpt-5-6-luna
OpenAI
$0.028
$0.028
$0.52
2026-09-12
gemini-3-flash
Google
$0.071
$0.071
$1.29
2026-09-18
gemini-3-8-flash
Google
$0.094
$0.094
$1.71
2026-09-18
llama-5
Meta
$0.124
$0.124
$2.25
2026-09-18
claude-haiku-4-5
Anthropic
$0.126
$0.126
$2.28
2026-09-12
grok-4-5
xAI
$0.185
$0.185
$3.36
2026-09-18
grok-4-6
xAI
$0.185
$0.185
$3.36
2026-09-18
claude-sonnet-5
Anthropic
$0.251
$0.251
$4.56
2026-09-12
gemini-3-1-pro
Google
$0.284
$0.284
$5.16
2026-09-18
gpt-5-6-terra
OpenAI
$0.284
$0.284
$5.16
2026-09-12
gpt-5-6-sol
OpenAI
$0.502
$0.502
$9.13
2026-09-12
claude-opus-4-8
Anthropic
$0.628
$0.628
$11.41
2026-09-12
claude-opus-5
Anthropic
$0.628
$0.628
$11.41
2026-09-12
claude-fable-5
Anthropic
$1.255
$1.255
$22.82
2026-09-18
claude-fable-5-1
Anthropic
$1.255
$1.255
$22.82
2026-09-18
gpt-6-astra
OpenAI
$1.255
$1.255
$22.82
2026-09-17
Read this against the numbers above
Every row below prices the FAST TIER's own 55-call run (r001-credential-verify) -- the deliberating tier's own token counts are on Cost.cost_by_model[1] and are not separately projected here.
Neither tier's registered run left anything to disable -- src/adapters/__init__.py's thinking parameter is only sent when a caller passes one, and this kit's own harness never does (see LLM.settings) -- so unlike several sibling kits, there is no reasoning-on/reasoning-off discrepancy to caveat here.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
The codeEvery file, and what it is for
Five modules, no framework, and almost no dependencies. The pipeline is stdlib Python, because a kit is meant to be read and changed by someone who cloned it ten minutes ago — every dependency is a thing they have to understand before they can touch the part they came for.
Four of these are swap seams: the points you edit to make the kit yours. Each is marked, and each block below is the module’s real shape, read out of the file rather than written here.
The files on this page are not in the public GitHub catalog.
src/segment.pysegment
cut the file into addressable sections, pure code
src/segment.py
# Cut a document into addressable sections. Pure code — no model, no network.
def sections(text):
def locate(text, value):
def span_label(secs, start):
src/select.pyselect — a swap seam
pick which sections carry each field, pure code
You change it to: map fields to your own file's headings; unmatched falls back to the whole document
src/select.py
# Pick which sections plausibly carry each field. Pure code -- the last deterministic step
SECTION_HINTS = {
def for_field(secs, field):
def plan(secs, fields):
src/prompt.pyprompt
assemble one call for all ten fields
src/prompt.py
# Assemble the extraction prompt. One prompt per file, all ten fields in it.
SYSTEM = (
def field_schema(fields):
def build(doc_text, secs, fields, selector):
def parse(raw, fields):
src/extract.pyextract — a swap seam
the AI layer, one provider one key — plus the pure-code computation downstream: three independent checks folded into one review flag
You change it to: this kit's own flat lookback window — replace with your actual accreditation standard's published requirement before trusting the computed flag for anything real
src/extract.py
# Extract one file's fields: segment, select, prompt, one model call, then a pure-code
HERE = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
FIELDS = os.path.join(HERE, "data", "fields.json")
CORPUS = os.path.join(HERE, "data", "corpus")
MAX_TOKENS = 4000
PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS = 180
def load_fields():
def load_doc(stmt_id):
def documents():
def _parse_date(s):
evals/judge.pyjudge
score field accuracy and the flag's recall/precision separately, pure code
evals/judge.py
# Score an extraction run. PURE CODE -- gold is exact and the answer is one value per cell, so
def norm(v):
def equal(field, got, want):
def score(fields, records, golds):
def score_flags(flags, golds):
Start hereThe shortest path into it
src/segment.pycut the file into addressable sections, pure code
src/select.pypick which sections carry each field, pure code A swap seam.
src/prompt.pyassemble one call for all ten fields
src/extract.pythe AI layer, one provider one key — plus the pure-code computation downstream: three independent checks folded into one review flag A swap seam.
evals/judge.pyscore field accuracy and the flag's recall/precision separately, pure code
Every entry above is a file in this kit, listed in the order the pipeline runs it.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
ScenariosWhat it costs at your volume
Everything below is computed from one measured base: 781 input and 300 output tokens per query, all of it fixed — this kit sends the document's own selected sections, so there is no retrieval depth to turn. Change the volume and the bill scales linearly, because nothing here batches.
Grading really is free here, and that is a property of the ruler rather than a discount
This kit is graded by pure code — the grader makes no model call, needs no key and sends nothing anywhere, so the grading line above is zero at every sampling rate and the leak count stays at nought. What that buys is a ruler you can run on every row, every time, for nothing. What it costs is reach: a code grader can only check what is mechanically checkable.
OperationsFour shapes of workload
The same arithmetic, at volumes worth naming. These are illustrations of scale, not measurements of anyone’s deployment.
Shape
Querys/day
Per day
Per month
Per year
Model follows the controls above.
What this ignoresWhere a real bill diverges
Read before quoting any of it
Output length is assumed constant.A terser or more verbose model moves it, and output is priced above input everywhere.
No volume, committed-use, batch or cache discount is modelled.Each moves real enterprise pricing and none are on a public rate card.
Longer documents cost more and nothing here caps them.This kit selects the document’s own sections in pure Python, so there is no vector store to price — but a corpus of longer records raises the input tokens per query directly, and that is the very number every figure above multiplies.
Grading adds nothing to this bill, and would if you changed the ruler.A code grader is free and local; swapping in an LLM judge would cost more per row than the extraction itself and send every row to a vendor. The instrument is a cost decision, not a footnote.
Rates age.Every one carries the date it was read on the cost page.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineWhat this kit exposes
This run's files are entirely synthetic (tools/build_corpus.py) -- no untrusted party wrote any file text. In a real deployment a credentialing file arrives from the provider's own application or a PSV vendor's report -- exactly the kind of externally-authored input this kit's architecture reads verbatim and trusts, with no verification step before its text reaches the model. No attack has been tried against this kit; see redteam.why.
Read from the shared .env or the real environment only, never written into the repo, never requested from a reader on any surface. src/app.py's /api/extract handler strips api_key and base_url out of any exception message before it reaches the browser, so a misconfigured key cannot leak into a UI error.
The experimentWe did not attack it — and three of four boundaries hold
An indirect prompt injection needs a field an outside party controls that reaches the prompt. In THIS corpus every file is generated by tools/build_corpus.py, so there is no live untrusted text in the run this report measures -- but a real deployment's PSV findings arrive from a PSV vendor's report or the provider's own application, and that surface has not been attacked. The four gates below are boundaries confirmed by reading the code, not payloads run through it. Confirmed by reading the code, not by a run, on 2026-08-21 -- no attack run was fired; see redteam.why.
Boundary checked
What could go wrong
What the code guarantees
Does an extraction ever write anywhere or trigger a downstream action?
An extraction could plausibly post a credentialing determination, an approval or a denial.
No code path does. src/extract.py::extract() and src/app.py's /api/extract both return a record only; neither writes to any file or store -- confirmed by reading every call site.
Could a misconfigured provider key leak into a UI-visible error?
An exception raised from a bad key or base URL could echo the secret back to the browser.
src/app.py's /api/extract handler strips api_key and base_url out of any exception message before returning it -- confirmed by reading the handler (see key_handling).
Is the PSV lookback window, or the review-flag arithmetic, something a prompt or a reply can move?
A crafted PSV finding could plausibly shift PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS, or talk the arithmetic into a different answer.
No. PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS in src/extract.py is a module-level constant, read once at import time -- nothing the model returns is consulted when computing it; needs_review is computed after the model call, in pure code (src/extract.py::compute()).
Could a crafted PSV finding talk the model into a fabricated sanction_or_adverse_action_found='no' despite a real adverse action being described?
A finding written to describe a real adverse action in routine-sounding administrative language could plausibly move sanction_or_adverse_action_found to 'no', clearing a file that should have been flagged.
Unmeasured -- no attack has been tried. sanction_or_adverse_action_found is an enum with no span at all (see Eval.scores.non_spannable_fields), unlike the copied-verbatim fields src/segment.py::locate() can check against the file text -- nothing stops the model from ASSERTING the finding is clean when the underlying text is not; see could_not_verify.
The first three boundaries hold, confirmed by reading the code, not by an attack trial. The fourth is the one this run has not tested: sanction_or_adverse_action_found is the field the whole guardrail depends on, and it is also the one field this kit's own span mechanism cannot check, because it is an enum, not a copied value -- no crafted input has ever been run against it.
The result0 attack trials, and three of four boundaries checked here hold in code: no write path exists, the PSV lookback window is a fixed constant the model cannot move, and a misconfigured key cannot leak into a UI error. The fourth -- whether a crafted PSV finding could talk the model into a fabricated 'no' on a real adverse action -- is unmeasured.
1externally-authored field a live deployment would carry (the PSV finding text itself, from the provider's application or a PSV vendor) -- synthetic on this run's corpus
0 of 0attack trials run
n/adecision-flip resistance -- not measured
This run's corpus is entirely generated (tools/build_corpus.py) -- no file's text was authored by an outside party. A real deployment's PSV findings arrive from a PSV vendor's report or the provider's own credentialing application -- exactly the kind of externally-supplied text this kit's architecture reads verbatim and trusts, with no verification step. Whether a finding crafted to describe a real adverse action in routine-sounding language could talk the model into a false sanction_or_adverse_action_found='no' is unmeasured for this kit.
Read this twice
The review flag is exactly as good as sanction_or_adverse_action_found. src/extract.py::compute() never re-derives that field from the PSV finding text -- it trusts the model's own answer and only checks the two date-based conditions. On this run both tiers scored a clean 100 pct extraction accuracy and 100 pct review-flag recall and precision, with zero errors of any kind across 55 files -- a genuinely clean run, and also a small one for a rule this consequential (see Business.not_good_enough). A future version should recompute sanction_or_adverse_action_found independently before trusting a live flag, and a red-team pass targeting exactly that field is the natural next measurement.
HonestyWhat this does not prove
Whether a PSV finding crafted to describe a real adverse action in routine-sounding administrative language could talk the model into a false sanction_or_adverse_action_found='no' -- no red-team run exists for this kit.
Whether the live app's own /api/extract behaves identically to the registered run under an adversarial file -- both use the same src/extract.py::extract(), but neither has been tested against one.
Whether a code-level consistency check on sanction_or_adverse_action_found (re-deriving it from the finding text by pure code) would catch a model's fabricated 'no' in practice -- none has been built or exercised.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineThe guardrail is enforced in code
Not a prompt instruction the model can ignore — a comparison applied after the reply is parsed, before anything downstream sees it.
the guardrail, verbatim
A file is routed for review when any of three checks fires: the license is expired, the PSV check is stale, or an adverse action was found. All three are computed in pure code from the model's own extracted fields -- never asked of the model directly, never overridden by anything it returns.
src/extract.py::compute() -- PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS and the flag arithmetic are a module-level constant and pure code, read once at import time. Unlike a prompt instruction the model could ignore, this guardrail cannot be talked out of firing by anything in the reply text; it only depends on the model's own extracted dates and its own sanction_or_adverse_action_found value being right in the first place -- a DIFFERENT, prompt-level dependency the flag inherits (see is_not and could_not_verify).
EvidenceDoes it hold?
What
Measured
The review flag never misses a file that should have been flagged
35 of 35 files that should have been flagged were flagged, on both tiers (100 pct recall) -- see Eval.scores.
The review flag never fires on a file that should not be flagged
0 false positives among the 20 files that should not have been flagged, on both tiers (100 pct precision).
The PSV lookback window is not something a prompt or a reply can move
PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS in src/extract.py is a module-level constant, read once at import time -- confirmed by reading compute(); nothing the model returns is consulted when computing it.
No code path writes a credentialing determination, approval or denial based on the flag
src/extract.py::extract() and src/app.py's /api/extract both return a record only; neither writes to any file or store -- confirmed by reading every call site.
The limitWhat a guardrail is not
IT IS NOT A CHECK ON sanction_or_adverse_action_found ITSELF. The flag trusts the model's own answer for that field completely -- nothing re-derives it from the PSV finding text before computing the flag. This run found zero disagreements on that field across 55 files on both tiers (see Eval.scores), which is evidence the prompt's stated 'however mildly worded' rule held up on this corpus, not evidence the guardrail itself checked and cleared anything -- it never looks at the finding text at all.
It does not guarantee a credentialing decision either way -- the flag is a routing signal for a credentialing committee, never itself a determination. See UI.shots and Data.breaks_on.
It has not been attacked. Whether a PSV finding crafted to describe a real adverse action in routine-sounding language could evade the flag is unmeasured -- see Security.could_not_verify.
WatchedWhat is watched, and why that one
2runs recorded
0 / 0deterministic metrics exact
+0.0%largest move — latency
0band breaches
—model half · needs provider URL
The kit measures 14 watched figures plus 8 comparability guards and 5 reference constants — three duties, not one list. 0 of the watched are grader rates, each on its own grader page; this board watches the ones that decide when to look again. Each square is one watched figure; filled means the latest run measured it.
7 measured by the latest run7 need the model half
Metric
Owner
Role
Why this one
field-exact-match-with-normalisation
Per-field exact match, light normalisation
alarm
extraction_accuracy specifically on sanction_or_adverse_action_found, since that is the one field this corpus is built to test — see taxonomy; the 550-of-550 clean-run rate, since a drop anywhere would mean something in the prompt or the corpus changed; span_rate on the eight spannable fields, since a value with no span is an assertion rather than a located citation — alarm on Any drop in extraction_accuracy below the measured 100 pct, on any field — this run's clean result is the baseline, and any regression means the prompt, the corpus, or the provider changed.
flag-confusion-matrix
Review-flag confusion matrix
alarm
review-flag recall specifically — 35 files should be flagged in this corpus, and missing one routes an adverse action, an expired license or a stale PSV check past committee review; false positives among the 20 files that should NOT be flagged, since a false positive costs a reviewer's time rather than a missed risk; whether a field-level miss (see the other grader) ever changes the flag — it has not, on either tier, this run, because there were no field-level misses to begin with — alarm on Any review-flag false negative, on any run — a missed flag is the safety-critical failure this kit exists to catch, and recall was 100 pct on both tiers this run.
GuardsBefore any comparison
Preconditions, not alarms. If one moves, the runs were not measuring the same system and nothing else on this board may be differenced.
Guard
Value
If it moves
corpus.doc_count
55
different corpus — nothing is comparable
corpus.bytes
26,634
files edited — the count held, the bytes did not
split.count
495
the sections count moved — a different set was scored
split.size_p50
46
the median size of one section moved
split.size_p95
113
the 95th-percentile size of one section moved
dataset.rows
55
the test set changed — every rate has a new denominator
tokens.context_limit
1,000,000
different model family
index.build_seconds
0.009
no index is built here — a change is in corpus preparation, not an index rebuild
all shared guards held between the recorded runs (documents 55, extraction_cells 550, failures 0, refusal_cells 0, thinking True) — which is why the history below is allowed to mean anything.
The reference constants — the null-grader baseline, the adjudication matrix, the negative count — are the third duty. They are never re-measured per run: a baseline that moves with the thing it measures is not a baseline.
BandsThe alarm bands
Derived from evidence, never picked: exact-match where two runs reproduced a metric to the digit, wider than the measured same-input drift for latency, one row of the negative class for any rate — denominator printed beside it.
Group
Band
Denominator
Where the band comes from
Extraction accuracy
exact match at 100 pct on both tiers
550 cells
two independent tiers (r001-credential-verify, r002-credential-verify) reproduced the identical figure to the digit -- the exact-match band MONITORING's own rule calls for.
Review-flag recall/precision
exact match at 100 pct / 100 pct on both tiers
35 files that should be flagged, 20 that should not
two independent tiers reproduced the identical figures to the digit.
Hallucinations
exact match at 0 on both tiers
550 cells
two independent tiers reproduced zero to the digit.
Span rate
exact match at 100 pct on both tiers
spannable extracted values (non-enum fields with a non-null answer)
two independent tiers reproduced the identical figure to the digit.
Latency
2,500ms / 3,422ms p50/p95 on the fast tier, 4,268ms / 5,288ms p50/p95 on the deliberating tier -- roughly 70 pct higher, not same-input drift, because the two tiers are different models
55 calls per tier
measured directly on both tiers.
Token totals
43,000 input tokens on both tiers (identical prompt); 16,503 output on the fast tier vs 17,302 on the deliberating tier, about 5 pct more
55 calls per tier
measured directly on both tiers.
HistoryRun history
2 recorded runs. A dash is a metric that run did not measure, and a dash is never differenced: not measured is a third state, neither a value nor a zero, and reading it as zero is how a board reports an improvement on a run that never looked.
Metric
r001-credential-verify 2026-08-21
r002-credential-verify 2026-08-21
extraction accuracy
1.000
1.000
invented values
0
0
values with a span
1.000
1.000
input tokens, whole run
43000
43000
model latency p50 ms
2500.00
4268.00
model latency p95 ms
3422.00
5288.00
output tokens, whole run
16503
17302
not a time series No two of these 2 runs measured the same system — they differ on the model — so nothing here may be differenced and the Verdict column is left off. Read this block DOWN a column, as a comparison between those runs, not along a row as a history.
DeviationsWhat deviated
0 breaches across 2 runs
The day a band breaks, a row renders here carrying the metric, the two runs, the band it crossed and what changed between them — model, prompt, chunker or top_k, read off the run records’ guards. A deviation with no diff beside it is an alarm nobody can act on.
RippleThe ripple map
Which figures move together, so one alarm reads as a system. Every edge carries its basis: measured names the run that showed it; reasoning admits nothing has varied it yet.
Lever
What moves
Basis
Evidence
which tier is called (fast vs deliberating)
output tokens (+5 pct) and latency (roughly +70 pct) move together; extraction accuracy, flag recall/precision, hallucinations and span rate do not move at all
a file with no adverse action and a current license and PSV check
all three review-flag components (license_expired, psv_stale, adverse) resolve false together and needs_review resolves false -- a clean file is never partially flagged
reasoning
src/extract.py::compute() only sets needs_review True when at least one of the three reasons fires -- confirmed by reading the function; this run's 20 true-negative files all resolved to an empty reasons list on both tiers.
FiresWhat fires when a band breaks
Where evals stop sitting beside the guardrail and start feeding it. Where the answer is nothing automatic, the row says so — hiding it would undo “What a guardrail is not” above.
Nothing fires yet. Not one of the 6 bands on this kit names a consequence, so there is no row to print. Which is the honest answer to the heading: a band that nothing is wired to is a number somebody has to notice, and this kit has only those. An empty table would have said the same thing while looking like a rendering failure.
NextThe three you would add first
Re-derive sanction_or_adverse_action_found from the PSV finding text by pure code, and compare it to the model's own answer before trusting the flagthe flag's only real dependency is a field this guardrail currently takes on faith -- src/segment.py already does word-boundary text matching for spannable fields, and a similar pattern check could flag a disagreement rather than silently trusting the model, though it would need to be stricter than the free severe-keyword floor this kit already ships (see Eval.baseline) to add anything.
Cross-reference a second PSV source before trusting a clean filethe flag is computed from one file's own PSV finding alone today (see Architecture.breaks_at_scale); a real credentialing file is often checked against more than one primary source, and nothing here does that.
Replace the flat 180-day PSV lookback window with a real accreditation body's published requirementPSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS is this kit's own declared policy, not a real standard's guideline (see README/SOURCES.md) -- Data.breaks_on and could_not_verify both name this as unverified against anything real.
None of these is built here. They are named against the seam they sit on so they can be argued with.
CadenceWhen to re-run, and what it costs
Re-check the flag's evidence on any change to PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS in src/extract.py, or to the sanction_or_adverse_action_found rule in src/prompt.py -- either changes what the flag is computed FROM. Re-run evals/run.py (paid) on any change to MAX_TOKENS or the provider/model.
What this cannot tell you
Whether the flag would still hold 100 pct recall and precision on a larger or harder set of mild-worded adverse actions -- this run's 12 mild-worded cases (of 35 files with an adverse action) all resolved correctly on both tiers, but 12 cases is not enough to rule out a harder confusable phrasing this corpus did not think to plant.
Whether a crafted PSV finding could move sanction_or_adverse_action_found without the flag ever noticing -- no red-team run exists for this kit, see Security.could_not_verify.
Whether the 180-day PSV lookback window matches any real accreditation body's actual published requirement -- it does not, by design; see README/SOURCES.md.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineNo framework, deliberately
No framework and no dependencies beyond the standard library -- requirements.txt is empty, with a comment explaining that the emptiness is load-bearing. The whole extraction decision is three files: src/segment.py, src/select.py and src/adapters/__init__.py.
The mappingSeam by seam, who owns what
Seam
File here
Framework equivalent
Note
the corpus
tools/build_corpus.py
none -- a seeded generator
55 credentialing files, generated from a fixed seed, never fetched. Gold is read back off the same generated dates and finding text the document states, never carried over from a separate target -- evals/check_labels.py asserts field completeness on every row before any run is allowed to spend; see data/SOURCES.md.
segmentation and selection
src/segment.py, src/select.py
text splitters / retrievers
a heading-based cut (src/segment.py) and a fixed field-to-heading map (SECTION_HINTS in src/select.py) -- no embeddings, no index, no ranking; a field absent from the map gets the whole document rather than nothing.
prompt assembly
src/prompt.py
prompt templates
the ten-field schema and the sanction_or_adverse_action_found rule are one declaration, and SYSTEM is built from it -- so the prompt can be published verbatim, which a template assembled two calls away cannot be.
the model
src/adapters/__init__.py
chat model wrappers / vendor SDKs
raw HTTP over urllib for every provider, so a forker runs this on whichever key they hold. This kit's own MAX_TOKENS=4000 (carried over from the sibling extraction kits' own experience on a similarly-shaped record) is a plain constant, not a client-library setting.
evaluation
evals/judge.py
eval harnesses
per-field exact match plus a separately-scored review-flag confusion matrix is a loop and a handful of counters, not a platform.
spend control
src/budget.py
none
an append-only ledger written BEFORE each call, shared by every kit under one .env so the cap is on the KEY rather than per kit.
The seams are the ones this kit already publishes, so the mapping cannot drift from the code.
GraphsWhere LangGraph changes the answer
Nothing here is a graph. The pipeline has one path per file -- segment, select, prompt, call, parse, compute -- with no branching and no state carried between files. A framework would add an orchestrator to a for-loop.
The other sideWhat a framework costs you
A different field schema (data/fields.json) or a different review rule needs its own gold set and its own evals/check_labels.py pass -- a framework's own schema layer would not remove that work, only relocate it.
SECTION_HINTS is a five-minute edit for a new file layout because it is a plain dict, not a configured retriever -- a framework's own chunking/retrieval abstraction would need its own re-tuning pass instead, with its own failure modes to learn.
Swapping providers is one function and one entry in PROVIDERS (src/adapters/__init__.py) -- a framework's own model abstraction would add a dependency and a version to track for the same one-line change this file already gives away free.
What we could NOT verify
Whether a framework's own retrieval or agent abstraction would resolve anything this kit does not already handle was not tested -- this run found zero field-level or flag-level errors on either tier (see Business.not_good_enough), so there is no observed weakness here for a framework to address.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineWhat one run of this kit actually cost, in time and tokens
Measured on r001-credential-verify on the fast tier, 2026-08-21. This kit records telemetry measured per run — 4 of the 6 readings on this axis, 4 of them with a band the guardrail board can judge against.
The readingWhat the last run measured
Reading
Last run
Band
What fires
Model, median
2,500 ms
2,500ms / 3,422ms p50/p95 on the fast tier, 4,268ms / 5,288ms p50/p95 on the deliberating tier -- roughly 70 pct higher, not same-input drift, because the two tiers are different models
—
Model, p95
3,422 ms
2,500ms / 3,422ms p50/p95 on the fast tier, 4,268ms / 5,288ms p50/p95 on the deliberating tier -- roughly 70 pct higher, not same-input drift, because the two tiers are different models
—
Input tokens
43,000
43,000 input tokens on both tiers (identical prompt); 16,503 output on the fast tier vs 17,302 on the deliberating tier, about 5 pct more
—
Output tokens
16,503
43,000 input tokens on both tiers (identical prompt); 16,503 output on the fast tier vs 17,302 on the deliberating tier, about 5 pct more
—
No movement column. Not one of the 1 earlier run on record is comparable with this one — a different model tier, or a changed guard — and differencing across that measures two systems rather than one. Said once here rather than as a dash on every row.
Retrieval not shown. No run of this kit has ever recorded a retrieval timing, because the pipeline has no such stage. Those readings are left out rather than dashed: a dash says “this run did not measure it”, which promises a later run could.
DriftMedian call, run over run
r001-credential-verify2,500 ms
r002-credential-verify4,268 ms
Hatched bars are runs that are not comparable with the latest — a different model tier or a changed guard. They are drawn because hiding them would make the history look shorter than it is, and greyed because differencing across them would be measuring two systems.
The other sideWhat this does not tell you
What we could NOT verify
No stage-by-stage span tree. These are whole-call timings; which part of the pipeline spent the time is not recorded by this kit's harness.
Latency is a run-level median and p95. The spread between the fastest and slowest single call is not stored, so the distribution cannot be drawn.
No earlier run is comparable to this one (a different model tier or a changed guard), so nothing on this page is a trend yet.
One machine, one network, one region. Latency includes the provider round trip from a single location and will not transfer to yours.
The first of those is the one worth doing something about, and it is a solved problem: instrumenting a pipeline so each step reports its own duration is a couple of lines. Observability / tracing has the code, and what the result looks like once it is running.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineWhat you provision, honestly
Everything measured on this page says where it was measured; everything not measured says that — the same contract as the other thirteen pages. Where a retrieval index would be on other kits, this one has: no index — each document goes whole into one call.
The machineWhat this needs
Dependencies
nothing beyond the standard library — requirements.txt names no package
Configuration
7 environment variables — the full knob table is at the bottom of this page
Last verified run
2026-08-21, across 2 committed records
Enumerated from the kit’s own source by build/facts/envscan.py, committed, and drift-checked — never typed into this page.
Your dataWhere everything sits
Artifact
Where
Leaves your machine?
credentialing files
data/corpus/*.txt — 55 files, generated once from a fixed seed (SEED = 20260821) by tools/build_corpus.py
read whole by src/segment.py and src/select.py; never modified after generation
gold labels
data/gold.jsonl — 55 rows, read back off the same generated dates and PSV finding the document states (never a target that seeded them), checked against the document text by tools/build_corpus.py's own _verify() pass
never — evals/judge.py is pure code, no model, no key
the field schema
data/fields.json — the ten-field record src/prompt.py assembles the user message from
read by src/prompt.py and src/extract.py only
the key
.env — never committed (see .gitignore)
only inside the Authorization header, to the configured BASE_URL (src/adapters/__init__.py)
The wireWhat crosses it, and when
Runtime call site
Destination
src/adapters/__init__.py line 55
the configured BASE_URL
Build-time (corpus tooling, run once)
Destination
none — this kit’s corpus is generated locally
Zero-egress topology: point BASE_URL at a local OpenAI-compatible server and nothing leaves the machine — statically true of the shipped adapter, whose only credential travels in the Authorization header.
The third state
What the provider retains, trains on or logs once a request arrives is not measured here — it is provider-dependent, and this page does not assert what no run of ours can verify.
The shapeHow it ships, and what you add
The key
Read from the shared .env or the real environment only, never written into the repo, never requested from a reader on any surface. src/app.py's /api/extract handler strips api_key and base_url out of any exception message before it reaches the browser, so a misconfigured key cannot leak into a UI error.
You add
your reverse proxy and your identity in front of one process — the kit deliberately ships neither, because identity belongs to your estate, not to a kit
Never ships
Docker, Helm, a queue, a database. The product is a folder of readable Python; what to run it under is this page’s job to state, not the kit’s job to impose
The ladderEach decision, and what you provision past its ceiling
Decision
The kit ships
Measured here
Past the ceiling
What stops being valid
model
one call per FILE, carrying the selected sections plus the ten-field schema, behind src/adapters/__init__.py — OpenAI-compatible wire format over raw HTTP, so a forker runs this on whichever key they hold. MAX_TOKENS is fixed at 4000 (src/extract.py), set on the sibling extraction kits' own experience with a similarly-shaped JSON record rather than a ceiling this kit has ever hit — 0 of 55 calls truncated on either tier.
2,500ms p50 / 3,422ms p95 on the fast tier, 4,268ms p50 / 5,288ms p95 on the deliberating tier (the fast-tier and deliberating-tier runs, 2026-08-21 -- see Cost.cost_by_model)
one call per file, no concurrency and nothing shared between calls — see Architecture.breaks_at_scale. A stack of thousands needs batching and a rate-limit strategy this kit does not have; MAX_CALLS_PER_DAY in src/budget.py caps the shared key across every kit on this machine, not this kit's own throughput.
point src/adapters/__init__.py at a different provider or model and every published accuracy/cost/latency figure is void until re-run — this run's numbers are this model's numbers, not a property of the prompt.
corpus refresh
tools/build_corpus.py regenerates the whole corpus — 55 credentialing files across a fixed roster of providers, licenses and PSV findings — byte-identically from a fixed seed (SEED = 20260821) every time it is run. There is no incremental refresh; gold is derived from the same generated dates and finding text the document states (never a target that seeded them) and the script's own _verify() pass checks every file's stated dates and finding text appear verbatim in the document text before anything is scored.
under 0.05s wall time to regenerate all 55 files and their gold labels (measured directly, 2026-08-21 (python3 tools/build_corpus.py, timed) -- see Data.index for the separate segmentation figure, a different step)
a real deployment's file layout, provider roster and PSV-finding vocabulary do not come from a fixed seed and grow without bound — how a genuinely varied set of real-world credentialing-file templates would change what src/segment.py (heading-based) and src/select.py (SECTION_HINTS) can resolve was not measured; see Architecture.breaks_at_scale and Data.breaks_on.
point tools/build_corpus.py at your own file layout and provider roster, and every published accuracy figure is void — they are this corpus's own planted ambiguity, not a property of the model.
labels
evals/check_labels.py asserts gold/document consistency (one gold row per document and vice versa, every enum value allowed by the schema) before evals/run.py is allowed to spend anything. Scoring (evals/judge.py) is per-(file,field) exact match with light normalisation, plus a separately-scored review-flag confusion matrix computed from the model's own extracted fields by pure code (src/extract.py::compute), never from a second model call.
550 of 550 possible (file, field) cells scored (55 files x 10 fields) plus 55 files carrying a review-flag verdict, scored separately (lenses.Eval.dataset, the fast-tier and deliberating-tier runs, 2026-08-21)
the gold set stops at 55 files and covers one planted ambiguity (a mild-worded adverse action vs. a severe one) at a fixed 40 pct rate — a real portfolio's mix of ambiguous phrasing is unmeasured, and a second corroborating PSV source is never cross-referenced; see Data.breaks_on.
a different field schema (data/fields.json) or a different review rule needs its own gold set and its own evals/check_labels.py pass before any published figure can be trusted again.
Every threshold is a measurement with its provenance beside it, or says is_measured:false. A ceiling with no seam says so — it is the point the kit is outgrown, never a forced join.
When it failsFailure signatures
What you see
What it is
First move
sanction_or_adverse_action_found answered 'yes' on a PSV finding that also says the license is 'otherwise active' or imposes 'no practice restriction'
the model read for ANY adverse action named anywhere in the finding, however mildly worded, rather than being talked out of it by reassuring language in the same sentence — this is the corpus's planted ambiguity (AMBIGUOUS_FRACTION=0.40 in tools/build_corpus.py), and on this run both tiers got every one of these cases right (see Eval.taxonomy)
read the finding's own full sentence before assuming a 'yes' next to 'otherwise active' is a mistake — the prompt's own rule (see README) is that a mild adverse action is still an adverse action, and this run found zero cases where either tier applied the severe-keyword shortcut instead of the stated rule (the fast-tier and deliberating-tier result files, both runs, 2026-08-21 -- see Eval.taxonomy (the mild-worded-adverse-action entry) and Eval.baseline for the same pattern's effect on the free severe-keyword floor)
No machine symptom — this failure leaves no trace in any output.
no path in src/extract.py::compute() or src/app.py writes a credentialing or network-participation determination, an approval, or a denial of any kind — needs_review is returned to the caller as a field on the response record and nothing downstream of this kit acts on it. A flipped flag on a real deployment would show up only in whatever credentialing system consumes this kit's output, which this kit does not have and does not simulate — so there is no committed artifact naming that failure, on purpose: it is out of this kit's boundary, not unmeasured.
Whether a 55-file, single-seed run's zero-error result generalises to a harder mild-worded adverse action this corpus did not plant, or to a larger sample size, was not tested — see Eval.could_not_verify. Concurrency (every run in this series is one call at a time, sequential), PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS=180 against any real accreditation body's actual published lookback requirement, and how either tier performs on a real, messy credentialing-file layout (a multi-page PDF packet, a payer-specific credentialing application form, a scanned PSV printout) are all unmeasured — see Eval.could_not_verify and Data.breaks_on for the full list.
The corpus licence, from the Data lens: MIT — this repository's own licence. Every provider, NPI, license number and PSV finding is invented; a real credentialing file cannot be published either — sanction and malpractice history is sensitive personal data tied to a real professional identity. Your corpus’s licence is yours to verify, and the labels you write are about your documents.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one linePer-field exact match, light normalisation
Does the model's value for each field match gold, after trimming whitespace/punctuation?
$0.00per 1,000 files
nodata leaves your network
yessame answer every time
MethodHow the test was run
evals/judge.py::score, in-process, no key and no model. The same function evals/run.py calls after every call, and the same field-match logic the free baseline is scored by — a baseline and a real run scored by two different scorers cannot be compared honestly.
Every grader on these pages scored the same 110 already-recorded answers. Nothing was re-generated, so this compares rulers and not models.
The inputOne real row, seen by every grader
doc
CR-0007
field
sanction_or_adverse_action_found
psv raw finding
Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing.
sanction found model
yes
gold sanction found
yes
needs review
yes
review reasons
['adverse_action']
Grader
Verdict
Why
Per-field exact match, light normalisation
correct
CR-0007's PSV finding reads "Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing." Gold: sanction_or_adverse_action_found=yes. Both tiers answered yes despite the reassuring second half of the sentence.
Review-flag confusion matrix
correct
Gold needs_review=true (reason: adverse_action). Both models' own extracted sanction_or_adverse_action_found=yes fed src/extract.py::compute(), which correctly computed needs_review=true on both tiers — routed to the credentialing committee, as it should be.
The formulaWhat it computes
The analysisWhat it actually did
Model
Result
the fast tier
scored 100.0%
the deliberating tier
scored 100.0%
In operationWhat to monitor
Reference standard: tools/build_corpus.py's gold, read back off the same generated dates and PSV finding the document states (never a target that seeded them); evals/check_labels.py asserts every field is populated on every row before any run is allowed to spend.
These rates are UNKNOWN, on purpose
This grader IS the reference standard for field values — it cannot be scored against itself. What can go wrong is the corpus's own generation logic, which tools/build_corpus.py's own _verify() pass checks by confirming every file's stated dates and finding text appear verbatim in the document.
Watch these
extraction_accuracy specifically on sanction_or_adverse_action_found, since that is the one field this corpus is built to test — see taxonomy
the 550-of-550 clean-run rate, since a drop anywhere would mean something in the prompt or the corpus changed
span_rate on the eight spannable fields, since a value with no span is an assertion rather than a located citation
Alarm on
Any drop in extraction_accuracy below the measured 100 pct, on any field — this run's clean result is the baseline, and any regression means the prompt, the corpus, or the provider changed.
How tight can the band be? There is no tolerance band on the field grade itself — it is exact match after trimming whitespace/punctuation, never a continuous score to round.
Cadence: Re-score on any change to src/prompt.py, data/fields.json or tools/build_corpus.py — the first two change what is asked, the third changes what is asked about. Re-run evals/run.py (paid) on any change to MAX_TOKENS or the provider/model.
The decisionWhen to reach for it
Use it
Gold is derived from the same generated dates and PSV finding the document states, never from a separate target — true of every kit corpus, never true of a real credentialing specialist's own file history.
Do not use it
The true field values are not known in advance — the normal state of a real credentialing review, and the reason this corpus is generated rather than captured.
Check a clinician's credentialing file before committee review
PresenterOpens the private repo. Visible to admins only.
In one lineReview-flag confusion matrix
Does the run's own pure-code needs_review (folding together the expired-license, stale-PSV and adverse-action checks) match the same computation run over gold's own true values?
$0.00per 1,000 files
nodata leaves your network
yessame answer every time
MethodHow the test was run
evals/judge.py::score_flags, in-process, no key and no model. Computed from the run's own pure-code needs_review (src/extract.py::compute), never from a second model call — the model never sees or states the flag directly.
Every grader on these pages scored the same 110 already-recorded answers. Nothing was re-generated, so this compares rulers and not models.
The inputOne real row, seen by every grader
doc
CR-0007
field
sanction_or_adverse_action_found
psv raw finding
Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing.
sanction found model
yes
gold sanction found
yes
needs review
yes
review reasons
['adverse_action']
Grader
Verdict
Why
Per-field exact match, light normalisation
correct
CR-0007's PSV finding reads "Public reprimand issued 2025-04-12 for recordkeeping violation; license otherwise active and in good standing." Gold: sanction_or_adverse_action_found=yes. Both tiers answered yes despite the reassuring second half of the sentence.
Review-flag confusion matrix
correct
Gold needs_review=true (reason: adverse_action). Both models' own extracted sanction_or_adverse_action_found=yes fed src/extract.py::compute(), which correctly computed needs_review=true on both tiers — routed to the credentialing committee, as it should be.
The formulaWhat it computes
The analysisWhat it actually did
Model
Result
the fast tier
scored 100.0%
the deliberating tier
scored 100.0%
In operationWhat to monitor
Reference standard: tools/build_corpus.py's gold needs_review, computed the identical way src/extract.py::compute() computes it — from the same generated dates and finding text the document states, using PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS=180.
These rates are UNKNOWN, on purpose
This grader is scored against a mechanically-derived gold value (src/extract.py::compute(), the same pure-code path both the run and the gold set use), not against a second grader's judgement — there is nothing here to publish an agreement rate against. What can go wrong is the corpus's own threshold placement, which tools/build_corpus.py's own _verify() pass checks against the same generated dates.
Watch these
review-flag recall specifically — 35 files should be flagged in this corpus, and missing one routes an adverse action, an expired license or a stale PSV check past committee review
false positives among the 20 files that should NOT be flagged, since a false positive costs a reviewer's time rather than a missed risk
whether a field-level miss (see the other grader) ever changes the flag — it has not, on either tier, this run, because there were no field-level misses to begin with
Alarm on
Any review-flag false negative, on any run — a missed flag is the safety-critical failure this kit exists to catch, and recall was 100 pct on both tiers this run.
How tight can the band be? There is no tolerance band — the flag is a binary confusion matrix (flagged/not flagged against gold), never a continuous quantity to round.
Cadence: Re-score on any change to PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS in src/extract.py or tools/build_corpus.py, or to data/fields.json's date or finding fields. Re-run evals/run.py (paid) on any change to MAX_TOKENS or the provider/model.
The decisionWhen to reach for it
Use it
Gold's needs_review is computed the identical way from the same generated dates and finding text the document states (PSV_LOOKBACK_DAYS in tools/build_corpus.py, matching src/extract.py's own copy) — true of every kit corpus, never true of a real accreditation body's own published lookback requirement.
Do not use it
The true credentialing determination is not known in advance, and no real accreditation body's own lookback figure has been checked against this kit's flat 180-day window — see Eval.could_not_verify.
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